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This paper looks at the distinctive ways in which critical studies of men and 
masculinity and critical feminist scholarship have sought to bring the concept of 
‘globalisation’ into their research.  A key concern of the paper is to outline these two 
inter-related, yet competing perspectives employ understandings of globalisation as a 
gendered process.  
 
In discussing the critical masculinities studies literature associated with writers such 
as Michael Kimmel and R. W. Connell, we argue that this research often approaches 
the process of globalisation in macro-structural terms; stressing the reification of 
hegemonically masculine values and identities in modern capitalist society.  In this 
sense globalisation is viewed in terms of the entrenchment of masculinised processes 
of ‘business-globalisation’ that corresponds with the interests of elite men—what 
Connell has labelled ‘transnational business masculinity’. Although the idea of 
hegemonic masculinity is often presented as a context within which competing and 
alternative gendered identities emerge – in this sense, gender identities are tied to 
notions of a ‘global gender order’ in which certain types of masculinity are dominant. 
 
By contrast a feminist body of literature that has emerged within studies of political 
economy, social anthropology and sociology has engaged more critically with notions 
of gendered identities in international politics—highlighting how gendered forms of 
inequality are cross cut with other forms of inequality (in particular those based upon 
race and ethnicity).  More recently, this literature has started to problematise the very 
category of gender highlighting how the gendered impacts of globalisation manifest 
themselves in terms of the re-shaping of and challenging of established gender 
identities.  Our analysis therefore raises concerns about the use of fixed categories 
such as ‘hegemonic masculinity’. In this sense, whilst there is some importance in 
dealing with concepts of elite or hegemonic masculine identities in thinking about 
globalisation – this should not be at the expense of a more theoretically nuanced 
understanding of the gendered impacts of globalisation.  Essentially we wish to 
demonstrate that whilst there is a clear analytical usefulness in dealing with ideas of 
hegemonic masculinity; at the same time, this should not be at the expense of 
developments within feminist theory. 
 
Introduction 
Masculinity Studies writers can be credited with bringing to attention not just how 
gender is part and parcel of social life and social organisation, but in addition how 
masculinity in particular is implicated in all aspects of sociality.  As Kimmel points 
out, masculinity is almost invariably invisible in shaping social relations, its ever-
present specificity and significance shrouded in its constitution as the universal, the 
axiomatic, the neutral.  Masculinity, he notes, assumes the banality of the unstated 
norm—not requiring comment, let alone explanation.  Its invisibility bespeaks its 
privilege.1  ‘One of the principal ingredients of men’s power and privilege’ then 
becomes men’s indiscernible status as men:2
The very processes that confer privilege to one group and not to another are 
often invisible to those upon whom that privilege is conferred…men have 
come to think of themselves as genderless, in part because they can afford the 
luxury of ignoring the centrality of gender … And the invisibility of gender to 
those privileged by it reproduces the inequalities that are circumscribed by 
gender.3
 
Thus rendering gender and masculinity visible offers a challenge to existing 
power relations and their continuing reiteration. 
 
In similar fashion, Masculinity Studies writers—like Kimmel and Connell 
amongst others—have drawn attention to how globalisation and global politics are not 
gender-free and largely privilege forms of masculinity in an emerging world gender 
order.4  It is at this point that we want to acknowledge both the considerable 
contribution of Masculinity Studies writers to gender analysis at a local, national 
level, and the opportunities their work enables at the level of the global in 
highlighting the ways in which supposedly gender-neutral global processes are linked 
to the politics of masculinity.  While ‘most theories of globalization have little or 
nothing to say about gender’,5 Masculinity Studies writers make visible the gendered 
character, for example, of the rhetorically gender-neutral neo-liberal market agenda in 
global politics, diplomacy, institutions and economics.6
 
However, as Connell points out, existing analyses of masculinities in many 
regions and countries cannot be simply be added together to produce a ‘global 
understanding of masculinities’.  In an ever more globalised world local analyses are 
no longer sufficient.  Rather, a grasp of large-scale social processes and global 
relationships is necessary to understand ‘masculinities on a world scale’.7  Given the 
increasing interactions between the global and local, this scale of analysis also 
becomes relevant to gender issues at the local level.8
 
                                                 
1 Michael Kimmel, ‘Integrating men into the curriculum’, Duke Journal of Gender, Law and Policy 4, 
(1997), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djglp/articles/gen4p181.htm (20 March 2006); see also 
Judith K. Gardiner, ‘Men, Masculinities, and Feminist Theory’, in Michael Kimmel, Jeff Hearn and R. 
W. Connell, eds, Handbook of Studies on Men & Masculinities (Thousand Oaks & London: Sage, 
2005). 
2 Jim McKay et al., ‘ “Gentlemen, The Lunchbox has landed” ’, in Kimmel et al., Handbook, p.270. 
3 Michael Kimmel, ‘Invisible Masculinity’, Society Sept/October 1993, p. 30; see also Michael 
Kimmel, ‘Foreword’, in F. Cleaver ed., Masculinities Matter!: Men, Gender and Development (London 
& N. Y.: Zed Books, 2003) p. xi. 
4 Michael Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its Mal(e)contents: The Gendered Moral and Political Economy 
of Terrorism’, in Kimmel et al., Handbook, p.414-5; R. W. Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, [1995] 2005), pp. xxii-xxiii; R. W. Connell and Julian Wood, ‘Globalization and 
Business Masculinities’, Men and Masculinities 7 (4) (April 2005); R. W. Connell, ‘Masculinities and 
Globalization’, Men and Masculinities 1 (1) (1998), R. W. Connell, Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2002), pp. 98-9, 134-9. 
5 Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition , p. xxi. 
6 ibid, pp. 254-5. 
7 ibid, pp. xx-xxi. 
8 Bob Pease and Keith Pringle, ‘Introduction’, in Bob Pease and Keith Pringle, eds, A Man’s World?: 
Changing Men’s Practices in a Globalized World (London & N. Y. : Zed Books, 2001), p. 9. 
Nevertheless, Masculinity Studies writings on global matters are as yet in their 
infancy.  According to Connell, ‘there are still only a handful of studies of masculinity 
formation in transnational arenas’,9 despite the critical importance of this work. 
Similarly, in the ‘Introduction’ to the Handbook of Studies on Men & Masculinities, 
Kimmel et al. state that research in this field on a world scale is very uneven and ‘still 
mainly a First World enterprise’.10  We acknowledge that at this point that such 
writings can scarcely be subjected to an overly nitpicking interrogation.  All the same, 
precisely because we agree that the investigation of gender and masculinities in global 
politics is indeed of great significance, we suggest that perhaps this is the moment to 
pause and look somewhat more closely at the theoretical and terminological tools 
presently employed by Masculinity Studies writers.  We are encouraged in this 
endeavour by Connell’s own view that it is timely to reassess these tools,11 given that 
the most commonly used emerged well over twenty years ago, and both theoretical 
and empirical materials on masculinities have developed since that time.  Moreover, it 
is even more likely that tools originally generated in response to local agendas may 
require some rethinking to deal with the growing body of literature on the global 
gender order. 
 
We suggest that by focussing upon the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’—a term 
almost ubiquitously used in Masculinity Studies in writings about both local and 
global arenas—we can offer some useful directions for situating the as yet relatively 
undeveloped analysis of gender and masculinities in global politics. 
 
Existing Problems in the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ 
Hearn has drawn attention to Connell’s early development and ongoing usage of the 
term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (first proposed in Connell [1979] 1983)—a term which 
is now virtually omnipresent in Masculinity Studies literature,12 as well as being very 
widely employed in Feminist and Sexuality writings attending to masculinity.  
Because this terminology has unparalleled usage and occupies a uniquely privileged 
positioning in the study of men and masculinities within local gender orders, it is 
clearly a crucial term for situating masculinities per se.  In addition, it is viewed by 
Connell and the vast majority of Masculinity Studies writers as framing analysis of 
masculinities in a global context. 
 
The term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ was most importantly a means to 
recognizing that ‘all masculinities are not created equal’13 and was intended to 
counter sharply oppositional conceptions of binary gender power and unitary 
categorical notions of gender identity.  The term invoked a framing that drew 
attention to the diversity within masculinities, to multiple masculinities.  Masculinity 
in this reading is not all of a piece, nor about power externalised.  Rather masculinity 
is de-massified as masculinities and these are not equal.  Hegemonic masculinity 
holds an authoritative positioning over other masculinities and will ‘dominate other 
                                                 
9Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition, p.xxiv. 
10R. W. Connell, Jeff Hearn and Michael Kimmel, ‘Introduction’, in Kimmel et al., Handbook, p. 9. 
11 Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition, p.xviii. 
12 Jeff Hearn, ‘From hegemonic masculinity to the hegemony of men’, Feminist Theory 5 (1) (April 
2004); R. W. Connell, ‘Men’s Bodies’, in R. W. Connell, Which Way is Up? (London & Boston, Ma.: 
Allen & Unwin, [1979] 1983); C. Beasley, Gender & Sexuality: Critical Theories, Critical Thinkers 
(Thousand Oaks & London: Sage, 2005), p. 192. 
13 Kimmel, ‘Integrating men’. 
types in any particular historical and social context’.14  However, at this point, as a 
number of writers within Masculinity Studies have indicated, the term becomes more 
slippery.  Flood has noted, for example, that Connell’s own usage of the term slides 
between several meanings.15  In short, we suggest that these may be summarised as a 
slippage between its meaning as a political mechanism tied to the word ‘hegemony’, 
as a descriptive word referring to dominant (most powerful and/or most 
widespread),16 and as an empirical reference specifically to actual groups of men. 
 
The first meaning of hegemonic masculinity as a political mechanism relates 
to Connell’s employment of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s usage of ‘hegemony’, 
meaning cultural/moral leadership to ensure popular or mass consent to particular 
forms of rule.  Gramsci’s concern was to challenge economic reductionist and merely 
coercive accounts of power by asserting the importance of leadership, its educative 
role in gaining consent and constructing alliances.  Power in this account is more 
subtle, more multi-faceted than mere coercion.  Thus hegemony at a local and global 
level is not necessarily to be equated with economic or military dominance.17  In this 
version of hegemonic masculinity as political mechanism, Connell’s account is 
instructive: hegemony  
refers to the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a leading 
position in social life … Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the 
configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted 
answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is 
taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of 
women.18 (emphasis added) 
 
Here the cultural leadership that is crucial to hegemonic masculinity is 
crucially concerned with the political agenda of sustaining hierarchically organised 
power relations between men and women.  This, above all, is its meaning, its raison 
d’être and leitmotif.  Yet when Connell and other Masculinity Studies writers outline 
how this political task is to be achieved, they locate the hegemonic masculine as 
always in necessary association with subaltern masculinities.19  In the process further 
characterising elements appear.  Connell distinguishes hegemonic masculinity from 
complicit, marginalised and subordinated masculinities.20  It is at this point that 
certain difficulties appear in the term hegemonic masculinity. 
 
On the one hand, hegemonic masculinity is a currently accepted ‘strategy’, a 
leadership positioning, a configuration of practice generating consent and alliances—a 
political mechanism, as noted above—and is not, Connell insists, a ‘fixed character 
                                                 
14 Robert van Kriekan et al., Sociology: Themes and Perspectives, 2nd edition (Sydney: Pearson 
Education Australia, 2000), p. 413. 
15 Michael Flood, ‘Between Men and Masculinity: An assessment of the term “masculinity” in recent 
scholarship on men’, in S. Pearce and V. Muller, eds, Manning the next Millennium: Studies in 
Masculinities (Perth: Black Swan Press, 2002). 
16 Hearn notes this distinction between powerful and widespread in his analysis of notions of dominant 
or pre-eminent masculinity.  Jeff Hearn, ‘The Swimsuit Issue and Sport: Hegemonic Masculinity in 
“Sports Illustrated” ’, The American Journal of Sociology 103 (6) (May 1998). 
17 Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts (London: 
Routledge, 2002) pp. 138-9. 
18 Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition, p. 77. 
19 ibid , p. 78 and Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its Mal(e)contents’, p.415. 
20 Connell, ibid, pp. 76-81. 
type’.  In similar fashion he asserts that subaltern masculinities are also not character 
types, with a set content, but rather are historically and socially variable.21  However, 
in Connell’s work and in most Masculinity Studies writings, hegemonic masculinity 
is given certain characteristics by its association with the accounts of subaltern 
masculinities.  Partly this occurs because while hegemonic masculinity is more likely 
to maintain—at least in its depiction in local western settings—its supposed definition 
as a political strategy of gender hierarchy, the subaltern masculinities are almost 
invariably presented as groups of actual men.22
 
The slippage in the term hegemonic masculinity from its meaning as about the 
political mechanism of legitimation to a merely dominant ideal or even more narrowly 
to dominant men is still more evident when Connell argues that its tenets are 
misogyny, heterosexuality and homophobia.23  Here the term is once again given 
specific characteristics that relate to—function as the negative mirror of—the array of 
subaltern masculinities.  Only the first of these characteristics, misogyny, would 
appear inevitably implicated in his account of the term as the legimating mechanism 
of gendered hierarchy.  The specification of heterosexuality and homophobia—which 
is tied to his account of ‘subordinated masculinities’—is at least in Connell’s usage of 
hegemonic masculinity in local western settings inclined to give it a more fixed set of 
characteristics than its politically-based definition around the gendered power of men 
as against women would warrant.  Such a specification also assumes a linkage 
between heterosexuality and gendered power that appears oftentimes as fixed rather 
than contextual.24  In both cases there is slide from political strategy into existing 
socially dominant ideals/forms of masculinity and/or actual men.  In this slippage, 
hegemonic masculinity as political mechanism becomes existing pre-eminent types of 
men. 
 
The danger here is three-fold.  Firstly, as Flood notes, it is politically 
deterministic and defeatist to equate that the most dominant (in the sense either of 
most powerful or most widespread) ideals/forms of masculinity are necessarily the 
same as those which work to guarantee men’s authority over women.25  Dominant 
forms of masculinity, for example, may not always, at all times, legitimate men’s 
power and those that do legitimate it may not always be socially celebrated or 
common.  Connell himself has acknowledged this slide in his work between 
                                                 
21 ibid, pp. 76, 77, 81. 
22 Other less commonly used sub-terminologies employed by Connell and others—such as Kimmel, 
Gerami and and Cheng—include ‘exemplary’, ‘protest’, ‘hyper’ and ‘subaltern’, as well as ‘hypo’ and 
counterhegemonic’ masculinities. With the exception of the first perhaps, all slide between referring to 
normative social practices/ideals (similar to Connell’s favoured definition of hegemonic masculinity) 
and describing groups of actual men.  In short, the array of terms employed in Masculinity Studies 
often implicitly refer to very different ‘registers’, and yet are typically employed as if they are all 
commensurable.  Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition; Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its Mal(e)contents’; 
Shahin Gerami, in Kimmel et al., Handbook; Cliff Cheng, ‘Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic 
Masculinity: Introduction’, The Journal of Men’s Studies 7 (3) (Spring 1999). 
23 R. W. Connell, ‘Studying men and masculinity’, Resources for Feminist Research (Fall-Winter 
2001); Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition, pp. 78-9; J. Newton, ‘White Guys’, Feminist Studies 24 (3) 
(Fall 1998). 
24 As can be seen in note 46, this fixity is undermined in Connell’s own analysis of hegemonic 
masculinity in the global context. 
25 Flood, ‘Between Men and Masculinity’. 
patriarchal legitimating strategy and merely dominant.26  He cautions that hegemonic 
masculinity may actually describe the position of a minority of men,27 and has 
recently re-emphasised that he does intend the term to be defined by its political 
strategic function in legitimating patriarchy.28  Nevertheless, the problem of a slide 
towards a usage that refers to dominant types of men reoccurs in his work on the 
global context, as we will discuss shortly.  This raises a second issue.  The 
understanding of hegemonic as simply socially dominant opens up a further slippage 
in which hegemonic is often understood even more fixedly as actual particular groups 
of men.  As Flood points out, actual men may or may not conform to cultural ideals 
concerning masculinity, even when these are associated with power or are 
pervasive.29
 
Such a focus on actually existing groups of men generates a third related 
problem concerning the association of hegemonic masculinity with types of men in 
the sense of actual men exhibiting a list of specific characteristics.  The social 
malleability of hegemonic practice is lost in equating gendered power with assumed 
fixed personality types, as Connell is well aware.  Yet this is a common inclination in 
many Masculinity Studies writings.30  In all these accounts hegemonic masculinity 
becomes a certain kind of masculinity that refuses being in any way like women, is 
‘success’ oriented, exudes self-reliant authority, is forceful and willing to take risks.  
As Clatterbaugh argues, such models prohibit asking which traits might be crucial to 
masculinity (and hence to hegemonic masculinity) and which are incidental.31
 
Usage of the term to refer to dominant actual men and their characteristics is 
no doubt understandable pedagogically and in the context of political activism, in that 
it gives gendered power a human face, a visceral reality, and makes the term more 
accessible and less abstract.  However, the cascading slide from hegemonic 
masculinity as the mechanism of patriarchal legitimation towards socially dominant 
(powerful and/or widespread) types of men, towards actual men, and finally towards a 
cluster list of generalised personality traits, is not a question merely of sloppy usage, 
theoretical confusion, or theoretical underdevelopment.  In all fairness, it must be said 
that these are not entirely discrete definitional entities.  Connell’s definition of 
hegemonic masculinity reveals this difficulty at the heart of his employment of the 
word, hegemonic: 
The concept of ‘hegemony’ … refers to the cultural dynamic by which a group 
claims and sustains a leading position in social life.  At any given time, one 
form of masculinity rather than others is culturally exalted. … This is not to 
                                                 
26 see also Patricia Y. Martin, ‘Why can’t a Man be more like a Woman?  Reflections on Connell’s 
Masculinities’, Gender & Society 12 (1998), p. 473. 
27 R. W. Connell, The Men and the Boys (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 30; Beasley, Gender & 
Sexuality, p. 229. 
28 R. W. Connell, ‘Reply’, Gender & Society 12 (1998), p. 476. 
29 Flood, ‘Between Men and Masculinity’.  
30 K. Plummer, ‘Male Sexualities’, in Kimmel et al., Handbook, pp. 181-2, Michael Kimmel, The 
Gender of Desire: Essays on Male Sexuality (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 2005), p. 71; Michael 
Kimmel, ‘Mars and Venus, or Planet Earth: Women and Men at Work in the 21st Century’, Lecture for 
the European Professional Women’s Network, 25 May 2005, Paris, 
http://www.europeanwn.net/tht_career/articles_indiv_career/m_kimmel_wom_men.html  (20 March 
2006); Cheng, ‘Marginalized Masculinities’; G. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences (Beverly Hills, Ca.: 
Sage, 1984). 
31 Kenneth Clatterbaugh, ‘What is problematic about Masculinities?’, Men and Masculinities 1(July 
1998), p. 33. 
say that the most visible bearers of hegemonic masculinity are always the most 
powerful people. … Nevertheless, hegemony is likely to be established only if 
there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, 
collective if not individual.32
 
Here is a clear instance of the way in which what is first described as cultural 
ideal with a political function becomes linked through its ‘likely’ requirement of 
dominance in the form of ‘institutional power’ to both its individual and collective 
‘bearers’.  All the same, the slide to dominant types of men/actual men—even if 
understandable and related to an attempt to give embodied materiality to the political 
mechanism of a legitimating cultural ideal—has problematic consequences.  For 
example, to put Connell’s conception of hegemonic masculinity as political 
mechanism to work, it is important to be able to disentangle hegemonic from merely 
dominant types/actual men or particular personality traits.  It is important to be able to 
perceive that a senior manager in the major accounting firm KPMG Australia33and his 
mates may represent a dominant masculinity in that he wields a widely accepted 
institutional power and may even perhaps have particular personality traits associated 
with that dominance, but may not necessarily be the politically legitimating cultural 
ideal (that is, a mobilising ideal–that most often has institutional clout) invoked by the 
term hegemonic masculinity. 
 
Problems as the term goes global 
The problems that seem to haunt the term hegemonic masculinity in local western 
settings are not surprisingly magnified on the larger stage of the global.  Here the 
question of whether the term involves a discussion of an authoritative cultural ideal 
mobilising patriarchal legitimation, dominant ideal/types of men, dominant actual 
men or their characteristic traits becomes very evident.  Connell has in recent times 
articulated usage of the term into the global arena as part of the project of 
globalization.  He discusses the globalization of gender, the constitution of a global 
gender order as an aspect of a ‘larger reality: global society’.  In this way, Connell and 
other Masculinity Studies provide a laudable contribution to the globalization 
literature.  Gender and masculinity are made visible in the contemporary world, made 
relevant to current preoccupations with international relations, notions of human 
rights, terrorism, migration, global markets and flows of capital, postcolonial debates, 
global communications and cultural forms including religious practices, and global 
inequalities, amongst a multitude of other pressing topics.  This is no mean feat, even 
though analysis of masculinities in transnational arenas, as noted earlier, is ‘still 
rare’.34
 
Nevertheless, Connell’s way of entering the still undeveloped field of situating 
masculinities—and specifically hegemonic masculinity—in global politics reveals 
unresolved difficulties in the latter term all the more starkly.  Connell, Hearn and 
Kimmel assert in concert that ‘the most obviously important’ issue in the future of the 
field researching masculinity in the setting of globalization ‘is the relation of 
masculinities to those emerging dominant powers in the global capitalist economy, the 
                                                 
32 Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition, p. 77. 
33 www.kpmg.com.au (20 March 2006) 
34 R. W. Connell, ‘Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities’, in Kimmel et al., Handbook, p. 85.  
We would note, in this context, that terms like gender or masculinity do not make their way into books 
like Griffiths and O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts. 
transnational corporations’.35  Connell’s particular contribution to this field, which 
appears largely accepted by Masculinity Studies writers,36 is that globalization in 
creating a world gender order involves the re-articulation of national hegemonic 
masculinities into the global arena.  Specifically he refers here to ‘transnational 
business masculinity’, which he describes as definitively taking the leading role as the 
emergent gendered world order, an order associated with the dominant institutions of 
the world economy and the globalization of the neo-liberal market agenda.  The 
leading role of transnational business masculinity re-articulates older and more locally 
based bourgeois managerial hegemonic masculinities.37  In this account transnational 
business masculinity is asserted to have ‘achieved a position of hegemony’, to occupy 
the position of  
a hegemonic masculinity on a world scale—that is to say, a dominant form of 
masculinity that embodies, organizes, and legitimates men’s domination in the 
world gender order as a whole. 
 
As is the case with the account of local western hegemonic forms, however, 
the political legitimating meaning of hegemonic masculinity quickly slides towards its 
meaning as the ‘dominant’ masculinity and how an actual group of men ‘embodies’ 
this dominant positioning, including how this group exhibits particular personality 
traits.  Connell asserts that ‘world politics is now more and more organised around the 
needs of the transnational capital’, placing ‘strategic power in the hands of particular 
groups of men—managers and entrepreneurs’—who self-consciously manage their 
bodies and emotions as well as money, and are increasingly detached from older 
loyalties to nation, business organisation, family and marital partners.38  These men 
are, in his account, dispositionally highly atomistic—competitive and largely 
distanced from social or personal commitments.  They embody a neo-liberal version 
of an emphasized traditional masculinity, without any requirement to direct bodily 
strength.39
 
Apart from the difficulties outlined earlier regarding the shifting usages of 
hegemonic masculinity—in particular the potential political and other problems 
associated with equating hegemony with dominant and actual types of men—
Connell’s account of the hegemonic status of ‘transnational business masculinity’ 
                                                 
35 Connell, Hearn and Kimmel, ‘Introduction’, to Kimmel et al., Handbook, p. 9. 
36 Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its Mal(e)contents’; p. 415 
37 Connell, ‘Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities’, pp. 84, 76-7; Connell, ‘Masculinities and 
Globalization’; Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition, p. 263; Cheng, ‘Marginalized Masculinities’. 
38 Interestingly, here Connell makes plain, by employing Altman’s analysis, that hegemonic 
masculinity in the global gender order is not necessarily marked by homophobia, nor does this global 
form necessarily have the same sexual relation to women.  Given that homophobia and heterosexuality 
marked by gender hierarchy are taken as central to his earlier (local/national/western) account of 
hegemonic masculinity (as is also the case for most Masculinity Studies writers—for example, 
Plummer), it is odd that this presumably highly important shift does not produce a discussion which 
might involve some reconsideration of the term integrating earlier and more recent global accounts.  At 
the very least the global analysis suggests that Connell (and others) might need to rethink earlier 
assumptions about the fit between Gender and Sexuality as axes of social structuring.  At most, the 
shift suggests a substantial rethinking of hegemonic masculinity as precisely about upholding gender 
hierarchy.  Dennis Altman, Global Sex, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Connell, 
Masculinities, 2nd edition, pp. 78-9; Connell and Wood, ‘Globalization and Business Masculinities’, p. 
359; Plummer, ‘Male Sexualities’. 
39 Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition, p. xxiii, pp. 255-6; Connell, ‘Globalization, Imperialism, and 
Masculinities’, p.77. 
reveals further issues in the term.  It is in the first instance not clear why Connell is so 
adamant that business masculinity occupies world hegemonic status in a globalizing 
world, and why he regards other potential contenders—he draws attention to military 
and political masculinities—as of less significance in this legitimating and mobilising 
role.  There seems at minimum here a limited engagement with the burgeoning and 
highly fractious literature on globalization.40  For instance, Connell does not engage 
with those writers who question the very notion of economic globalization.  Nor does 
he contend with those writers who might dispute this focus and by contrast propose 
multiple, uneven and contradictory globalizations.  Mann provides an example of the 
latter view, suggesting that unprecedented hegemony is more characteristic of 
contemporary military power than economic relations.41
 
Whatever the force of different perspectives on globalization, the point is that 
it is not straightforward to perceive it in the way that Connell does, and hence no 
simple matter to claim that transnational business masculinity, a masculinity 
organised in relation to economics, is the hegemonic form on a world scale, 
legitimating men’s dominance in the global gender order as a whole.  Given this, why 
does Connell make the claim?  Connell, in his global and macro historical moments, 
is inclined to presume that masculinity (a gender category) is to be understood by its 
constitution through class relations.42  Though Kate Hughes’ summary of Connell’s 
perspective is not intended to make this point, it supports this interpretation.  She says 
Connell  
provides an interesting analysis of the ways in which globalization is exported 
a version of patriarchy … to cultures whose economies have come to be 
vulnerable to such [transnational executives] and to such corporations’.43
 
While gender in this approach certainly gives particular characteristics to 
globalising capitalism, it seems to be carried along by and within host class 
relations—a comparatively passive and responsive sub-structure.  Such a perspective 
seems curiously at odds with Connell’s overriding conception of gender as a shaping 
force in local and global social relations.  Moreover, Connell’s framework—with its 
tension between gender as riding on the coat-tails of class and gender as active 
socially constituting—is frequently replicated in Masculinity Studies writings, even in 
the work of those who are less wedded to an economic focus in research on the 
politics of masculinity on a world scale.44  Yet the crucial feature of the term 
hegemonic masculinity is precisely that it enables the Gramscian conception of power 
                                                 
40 Even Connell’s own critique of globalisation literature as the view from the metropole, a projection 
from ‘the centre’, involving erasure of the non-metropolitan world seems only somewhat integrated 
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as more multi-faceted than mere coercion, including economic coercion, and that it 
not supposedly to be equated with economic or military dominance.  Connell’s term 
has the great advantage that encourages a creative and subtle understanding of power 
as constitutive, as always associated with the mobilisation of consent and complicit 
embodied identities.  However, Connell, along with many other Masculinity Studies 
writers, tends to fall back into more limited, even economistic readings of hegemony 
when dealing with the global. 
 
We are not suggesting that the leading contender for the position of hegemonic 
masculinity on a world scale is not transnational business masculinity, nor are we 
necessarily disputing that the other contenders are military and political.  Our point 
here is simply to stress that the term does not actually enable these judgements at 
present and Connell’s argument is insufficiently tied to demonstrating how such 
masculinities have achieved a hegemonic role specifically in relation to the gender 
order, rather than merely as a handmaiden to the ‘current stage of capitalism’45 or a 
dimension of globalising western institutions. 
 
Broadly speaking, it is not clear how one would assess whether any particular 
version of masculinity has an over-arching legitimating function.  Connell’s highly 
influential, even pervasive account of hegemonic masculinity is shown perhaps more 
clearly in his work on the global gender order to rest on some relatively undefined 
bases.  There is very little information in his work on the question of analysing the 
crucial matter of how the legitimation of gendered power occurs and thus how to 
assess which masculinity is the hegemonic one.  It is not self-evident overall how to 
judge which masculinity (or masculinities) might be deemed hegemonic over all 
others.  Rather Connell, and indeed Masculinity Studies writers generally, rely heavily 
on filling out their accounts of hegemonic masculinity by specification of content, by 
specifying types of men.  At the very least this silence regarding how to demonstrate 
the legitimating/mobilizing role that constitutes hegemonic authority as against a 
reliance on demonstrating the content of masculinities said to have a legitimating role, 
may partly explain why the term is often interchangeably used to refer to the leader 
masculinity (as Connell does) and to refer to several hegemonic masculinities relating 
to sub-societal communities or dimensions of society—that is, to several dominant 
masculinities in particular and more limited contexts (as occurs in Kimmel’s work 
concerning various international reassertions of hegemonic masculine entitlement in 
right-wing militias in the USA and Scandinavia and in Islamist terrorist groupings).46
 
What to do? 
This discussion of the term hegemonic masculinity suggests that situating 
masculinities in global politics is no simple matter, and that usage of the term in 
Masculinity Studies writings may require further analysis.  While we intend to 
develop this analysis further in forthcoming work, at this point we would simply point 
out that current approaches in Masculinity Studies have multiplied the term 
‘masculinity’ but have tended to retain the notion of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as a 
singular monolith, which is insufficiently specified even to do justice the existing 
range of Masculinity Studies writings. 
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Like Connell we believe, it is timely to reconsider the concept.  Our view is 
that the term still has much to offer.  However, we suggest that it is not enough to say 
that it needs work but is still essential, as Connell does.47  Rather the usage of the 
term in the global arena shows up earlier limits of term all the more clearly. 
 
The reconsideration of hegemonic masculinity may well be assisted by not 
only greater integration of the insights of a range of Masculinity Studies writings, but 
additionally a closer attention to the insights of related feminist work.  While the 
rhetoric of a close engagement between Masculinity and Feminist scholarship is 
regularly enunciated,48 contra such statements much Masculinity Studies work is at 
something of a distance from current debates in Feminist thinking.49  If the rethinking 
we have tentatively outlined was undertaken in concert with recent feminist analyses, 
this distance might well be overcome and at the same time lead to a more developed 
understanding of hegemonic masculinity in global politics that could be employed in 
gender studies (feminist and masculinity studies) and beyond. 
In this concluding discussion section of the paper, therefore, we move away from the 
analysis of hegemonic masculinities presented in the men and masculinities literature. 
Instead the paper focuses-in on how we might move to develop a gendered 
understanding of globalization that recognises both the strengths and limitations of 
discussions of hegemonic masculinity. Importantly, in this section we are not 
suggesting that notions of hegemonic masculinity curtail a focus on the ‘feminine’ in 
global politics. Rather, we suggest that a more thorough engagement with a feminist 
literature in which globalized notions of ‘gender’ are shown to intersect with other 
forms of social identity in localized spaces of the global political economy adds 
considerable value to discussions of the relationship between masculinity and 
globalization. 
 
Gendering Globalization, Rethinking Hegemonic Masculinity 
As we have argued already, Connell raises some important issues in looking to the 
relationship between a hegemonic masculinity and globalization. Ideas of hegemonic 
masculinity provide a useful way of conceptualising the privileging of certain sets of 
gendered values in mainstream understandings of globalization. It is also clearly the 
case that feminist scholarship within international politics (including both studies of 
international security and international political economy) have sought to employ 
notions of hegemonic masculinity50. Our focus is not on how feminist scholarship in 
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IR and IPE has sought to incorporate notions of hegemonic masculinity (although this 
is, of course, an important issue). Rather, we aim to examine how notions of 
hegemonic masculinity might be brought into, and even reformulated by, 
engagements with feminist studies of globalization.  
 In doing so, we point to the limitations of viewing globalization through a 
‘lens’ of hegemonic masculinity. This is precisely because of the point that we have 
already raised in this paper – the problem of how to get from the identification of a  
‘hegemonic’ masculinity in certain globalized zones of international politics (e.g. the 
multinational corporation) to a specific theory of the relationship between this 
hegemonic masculinity and processes associated with globalization 
 It should be pointed out that one argument that we find problematic in 
Connell’s work is the rejection of ‘discursive approaches’. Connell argues in the 
introduction to the latest edition of Masculinities for example that ‘discursive 
approaches have significant limits. They give no grip on issues about economic 
inequality and the state..”51. And yet this is a problematic position given the turn 
within International Political Economy (IPE) towards approaches that stress the 
discursive production of globalization in the everyday practice of international 
politics.  Weldes for example in analysing the discursive construction of globalization 
suggests that: 
Analysing globalisation as a discourse allows us to ask what exactly this 
discourse does. This is important because discourses are deeply political, 
producing significant material and ideational effects. Put simply, the 
representations that most people entertain about globalisation – what they think 
globalisation is and how it works – affects how they act. It is this effect that can 
render globalisation discourse a self-fulfilling prophecy52
What is significant is that this critical globalization literature is specifically 
focussed on how discourses of globalization have shaped state policy-making. 
Creating ‘logics of no alternative’53 and ‘imagined economies’ of globalization54.  
Furthermore, the state remains centrally important to recent IPE scholarship on 
globalization. The important point here is that discourses are viewed as having both 
ideational and material effects. Of course, as Waylen has recently argued55, gender is 
overwhelmingly absent from much of this recent critical globalization literature. Yet, 
it is important to develop these notions of the relationship between discourse and 
practice in globalization studies by incorporating a gender perspective.  . An 
appreciation of the interrelationship between both discourse and practice is common 
to feminist scholarship in both economics and international politics. As Barker argues 
there has emerged an ‘interpretative approach to feminist economics and feminist 
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political economy’ which ‘at a minimum, entail a commitment to the notion that the 
material and the discursive are not radically separate’56. In this sense, notions of 
hegemonic masculinity are very useful because they help us to develop ways of 
seeing how constructions of masculinity are built into the institutions and structures of 
the global political economy. However, as we suggest here – a focus on hegemonic 
masculinities in thinking about globalization is, in itself, insufficient – and , in fact, it 
is through thinking through the discursive processes whereby neoliberal gloablization 
is produced and reproduced (in the way that critical globalization scholarship has 
forced us to do) that some of the shortcomings of the masculinities literature on 
globalization are exposed .  
First, the emphasis on the multinational firm as an agent of globalization seen 
in both the liberal ‘first wave’ globalization scholarship and in the masculinities 
studies approach. By contrast, we would suggest that it is perhaps more useful to 
focus on the discourses and ideas that have enabled the multinational firm to be seen 
as the primary agent of neoliberal globalization. This is perhaps less of a criticism of 
the masculinities studies literature – indeed, we would suggest that an investigation 
into the emergence of discourses that have enabled MNCs an effective free reign in 
certain parts of the world is one area that could tell us an interesting story about the 
emergence of Connell’s ‘Transnational Business Masculinities’.  The MNC can be 
viewed as an important site for the production of ideas relating to hegemonic 
masculinity – but we first need to identify how and why the firm is understood as so 
central to the current phase of (economic) globalization. This requires that we 
investigate globalization as a discourse (one that is rooted in notions of the innate 
rationality and progressive nature of the market economy57) and not just a straight 
forward economic phenomenon.  By contrast, DeGoede’s work sets about doing 
precisely this. Her focus is on the emergence of gendered discourses in the 
seventeenth century that sought to construct the realm of global finance in terms of its 
‘innate’ rationality (rather than as an ‘irrational’ realm of gambling)58. DeGoede 
employs the metaphor ‘mastering lady credit’ to describe these processes (i.e. the 
irrational and ‘feminine’ is reconstructed as a rational realm of international business 
practice). Parallels can be drawn therefore with the work of scholars such as Ling and 
Han who have identified how the fall-out from the 1997 Asian financial crisis has 
been associated with a ‘feminization’ of ‘irrational’ Asian business practice (‘crony 
capitalism’) and the need for the opening up of Asian markets to rational (read 
hegemonicially masculine) global business interests59. 
Second, in thinking through how hegemonic masculinities are produced – we 
also need to open up space for thinking about the production of femininities. 
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Importantly, we suggest that this is not a straight forward process. Because, whilst we 
will argue later in this paper that the production of transnational business 
masculinities are intimately linked to ideas concerning docile and nimble fingered 
‘productive femininity’ – this is not the whole picture. The performance of these 
gendered discourses is mediated by other forms of social identity –specifically race, 
religion, ethnicity and nationality (although this is by no means an exhaustive list).  
 Third, a strength of critical globalization scholarship in IPE is that it points to 
how globalisation is not a singular, universal or uniform process.  Much of the early 
globalisation literature viewed globalisation as ‘the developing outcome of some 
historical process’60. The problem with viewing globalising as a uniform and all 
encompassing process is highlighted by Germain who argues that views of 
globalisation as inevitable and as something that gradually pervades every aspects of 
human activity are misguided61. By contrast, Germain calls for a ‘historical 
perspective’ whereby we examine how globalisation comes to be set within multiple 
contexts throughout history.  Thus we need to consider how globalization is not a 
straightforward top-down process, but is located in everyday practice. We could also 
say that this is part of the problem with a focus on hegemonic masculinities - that 
whilst of course it is important to look at global processes/structures and reveal how 
they are gendered, what is perhaps more interesting and important is to investigate the 
relationship between the local and the global and to think through how everyday 
practices and relationships are reconfigured (or not). Such an approach is quite 
different to those that seemingly map gendered ideologies of hegemonic masculinity 
onto specific male bodies. Rather, the focus in this section of the article is to articulate 
the complex dynamics through which privileged notions of masculinity are mediated 
and transformed in local spaces and in relation to femininities. 
Gendering the political economy of globalization 
Building a gendered political economy perspective that takes masculinities seriously 
requires the following: (1) That we create space for thinking about how the state 
mediates relationships between localized and globalized ‘gender cultures’ and (2) To 
more thoroughly investigate the relationship between ‘transnational business 
masculinities’ – in particular the idea that MNCs embody these characteristics – and 
processes of ‘feminization’ that have been identified in the feminist literature as a key 
feature of globalization. 
 
(re) locating states in discussions of masculinity and globalization 
We cannot even begin to think about how global masculinities ‘touch down’ in 
national spaces without a focus on this key institution. It goes without saying that 
Connell’s early work incorporates a specific focus on the state – and as we saw in the 
quotation from the latest edition of Masculinities, Connell clearly recognises the state 
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as a significant institution. However, it should also be noted that in his writings on 
globalization, Connell to a certain extent buys into arguments concerning the ‘decline 
of the state’ in the face of (economic) globalization. Hence: 
Globalization is best understood as centering on a set of linked economic 
changes characteristic of the current stage of capitalism. The main changes are 
the expansion of worldwide markets, the restructuring of local economies under 
pressure of the world economy, and the creation of new economic institutions.62
Where the state is discussed, the argument is made that the corrosive influence 
of global capitalism is undermining the power of states to implement welfare-oriented 
policies that may have positive effects in terms of gender equity. In this sense, the 
rather benign (Western European) state is being undermined by an aggressive 
masculinist capitalism63. Two criticisms can be raised here. First, such a view fails to 
recognise the role that states themselves have played in constructing the current phase 
of global capitalism (after all it was state policies that created the deregulation of 
finance and investment that enables transnational flows of finance and industrial 
capital). Second, such a perspective obscures the extent to which states and practices 
of ‘nation-building’ are themselves deeply gendered. We should pay particular 
attention to Rai’s ‘caution against nostalgia for the centralized nation-state among 
critics of globalization’64.  
Scholars such as Lily Ling and Aiwah Ong provide very interesting ways into 
thinking about the role of the state within a gendered political economy framework 
that takes masculinities seriously. Importantly these writings focus on the role of the 
state in non-Western contexts and this also is very important because it highlights 
why we need to think more carefully about the relationship between so-called 
‘transnational business masculinities’ (framed around essentially Western even 
imperialist masculine elite identities) and alternative gender identities.  What these 
examples serve to illustrate is that the relationship between global capitalist 
production and localized gendered labour regimes is effectively mediated by the state. 
This is particularly the case in the ‘developmental states’ of East and Southeast Asia. 
But even in states that have adopted a more neoliberal style of economic development 
(including those Asian states that have undergone a fundamental shift towards 
neoliberal economic management since the 1997 financial crisis), the state remains a 
crucial institution in the gender politics of global restructuring. 
 The idea that gender relations and identities are fundamental to how states 
operate can be viewed as challenging the rather under socialized accounts of the state 
that characterize the bulk of ‘first wave’ or mainstream globalization scholarship 
(whereby the state is set up as simply responding to pressure from external economic 
forces and actors that are challenging the power and authority of states).  In contrast to 
this idea Ong has introduced a model of ‘graduated sovereignty’ whereby the shifting 
relations between market, state and society are manifested in government policies that 
act to re-shape the relationship between specific populations of people and the global 
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market economy65.  The differential treatment of segments of the population takes 
place at the same time as the development of a ‘state-transnational network’ (which 
includes the ceding of certain aspects of sovereignty to certain multinational 
corporations operating in export processing zones).  In this sense, the state is 
undergoing a process of transformation, but a transformation that is deeply rooted and 
embedded in the local socio-political context.  
 An alternative, and perhaps more overtly gendered, conceptualisation of 
the relationship between global capital and the state has been provided by Ling66 who 
has sought to demonstrate how states in East Asia have promoted a particular vision 
of economic development which involved authoritarian, patriarchal-Confucian states 
pursuing economic development strategies that both confronted and incorporated 
elements of the dominant western-centric neoliberal development paradigm. Ling 
discusses the notion of hypermasculinity (first utilized by Ashis Nandy in relation to 
British colonial power relations67) to convey the glorification of aggression, 
competition, accumulation and power that are a hallmark of these states. Asian states 
are viewed as pursuing hypermasculine developmentalism as a reaction to an 
aggressive, competitive form of globalization. Hypermasculinized developmentalism 
in Asia can also be understood, therefore, as something that emerges out of the desire 
to construct engagement with global capitalism around notions of nation-building and 
national identity (a theme also found in Moon’s work on South Korea’s ‘militarized 
modernity’68).  The model of hypermasculine developmentalism is a useful way of 
thinking about how global and local forces play out in the reconstitution of gender 
relations in specific national contexts. Crucially Ling’s work is not about how 
subaltern groups of actual men play a role in the defining of a hegemonic masculinity 
(the critique that we levelled against Connell earlier in the paper). Rather, the 
emphasis is on how notions of masculinity are embedded in the discourses and 
counter-discourses of global restructuring. 
 
Transnational Business Masculinities and the discourse of ‘productive femininities’ 
Developing an understanding of globalization in which we can meaningfully discuss 
hegemonic masculinity also requires that we focus more carefully on the whole 
concept of ‘transnational business masculinity’. In what follows we suggest that 
whilst there is a certain utility in this concept – what we need to bring into discussions 
of global ‘business’ masculinities is how these masculine identities relate to the highly 
‘feminized’ nature of globalisation. When we look at globalization in terms of 
‘everyday practice’ we are confronted by the fact that successive waves of  
globalization have relied heavily upon women’s paid and unpaid labour69 .  This is a 
key finding of feminist IPE and the globalization turn in masculinities studies risks 
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overlooking these findings because they seem to be more concerned with 
investigating elite masculine identities.  
 We would suggest however, that links can be made between feminist IPE and 
the men and masculinities globalization scholarship. This lies in identifying how an 
essentially ‘hegemonically masculine’ approach to international business management 
is predicated on idealized notions of productive and nimble fingered workers is one of 
the key gendered discourses of globalization70.  
Studies of the relationship between economic globalization and the emergence 
of new forms of hegemonic masculinity have tended to focus on the perpetuation of 
managerial cultures through for example the media71, global ‘management speak’ and 
the lifestyles of global managers72 .What is missing from this literature is an 
investigation into the relationship between  highly masculinized global 
business/capitalism and the highly feminized forms of employment that underpin 
contemporary global economic restructuring. The MNC, and the forms of 
management practice that are identifiable within these global firms, need to be 
recognized as a principle site for the production of ideas relating to gender roles at the 
global level. Most importantly, we can also point to the role of the firm in the 
production of gender identities centred around notions of the ‘docile’ factory ‘girl’ or 
‘flexible femininity’73. As Salzinger notes in her research into feminized factory 
employment from Mexico, manager’s understandings of feminine employment and 
female characteristics are contributing to the ideological hegemony of powerful 
discourses concerning the docile and dexterous female factory worker74.   
 Powerful and also globalized discourses of productive/flexible femininities as 
well as transnational business masculinity can be viewed as helping to underpin the 
practice of contemporary global capitalism. Yet what is really interesting to look at is 
how these globalized discourses touch down in national/local spaces. It is for this 
precise reason that we need to make sure that the state remains central to our analysis 
of the relationship between the global and the local in the politics of global 
restructuring. Furthermore, gender identities do not exist in isolation – as we have 
already argued they intersect with other forms of social identity, identities that like 
gender are often embedded in local societies through specific state policies. And yet, a 
focus on these globalized discourses, provides an important entry point into 
investigating the gender politics of globalization. 
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The strength of much feminist scholarship is that it often begins with a focus 
on the everyday experience of marginalized groups of women (think Enloe’s work 
here75) and builds outward from there. Using concepts of hegemonic masculinity is 
very useful but scholars need to go further than simply looking at how transnational 
business elites 'embody' a transnational business masculinity76  – we need to move 
beyond the focus on masculinities alone and place this analysis within a broader 
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